This article discusses the provable security of pseudorandom-function (PRF) modes of an iterated hash function using a block cipher. The iterated hash function uses the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) mode for the compression function and the Merkle-Damgård with a permutation (MDP) for the domain extension transform. It is shown that the keyed-via-IV mode and the key-prefix mode of the iterated hash function are pseudorandom functions if the underlying block cipher is a pseudorandom permutation under a related-key attack with respect to the permutation used in MDP. More precisely, the key-prefix mode also requires that E IV (K) ⊕ K is pseudoramdom, where E is the underlying block cipher, IV is the fixed initial value of the hash function, and K is a secret key. It is also confirmed that the MMO compression function is the best choice with MDP among the block-cipher-based compression functions in the PreneelGovaerts-Vandewalle model in terms of the provable security.
Introduction (1) Background
In many textbooks on cryptography, a (cryptographic) hash function is defined to be a function mapping an input string of arbitrary length to an output string of fixed length, and satisfying preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance and collision resistance. However, hash functions are used in almost all cryptographic schemes, and required various security properties other than the three listed above. For example, a hash function is used to instantiate a random oracle. It is also used to construct a pseudorandom bit generator and a pseudorandom function. (Second-) preimage resistance and collision resistance do not validate such usage in general.
(2) Contribution
This article discusses the provable security of pseudorandom-function (PRF) modes of an iterated hash function using a block cipher. The iterated hash function uses the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) mode [8] for the compression function and the Merkle-Damgård with a permutation (MDP) [7] for the domain extension transform. It is called MDP-MMO in this article. The widely used PRF using a hash function is HMAC [2] . However, it is not very efficient. It invokes the hash function twice to process a given input. In this article, two more efficient PRF modes are considered. One is called the keyed-via-IV mode. It simply replaces the initial value of the underlying hash function with the secret key. The other is called the key-prefix mode. It first prepends the secret key to a given input, and then feeds it to the underlying hash function.
It is shown that the keyed-via-IV mode and the keyprefix mode of MDP-MMO are PRFs if the underlying block cipher is a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) under a related-key attack with respect to the permutation of MDP. The novelty of the result is that the PRF property of the modes is reduced to the PRP property of the underlying block cipher, not simply the PRF property of the compression function.
Actually, the key-prefix mode also requires that E IV (K) ⊕ K is pseudoramdom, where E is the underlying block cipher, IV is the fixed initial value of the hash function, and K is a secret key. This property cannot be implied by the PRP property of E since the key of E is a fixed public constant. It does not seem difficult, however, to design a block cipher with the property.
The other contribution of the paper is that it confirms that the MMO compression function is the best choice with MDP among the block-cipher-based compression functions in the PGV model [11] in terms of the provable security.
(3) Related Work
Hirose and Kuwakado [6] discussed the following security properties of MDP-MMO: Collision resistance, indifferentiability from a variable-input-length (VIL) random oracle, and pseudorandomness of HMAC using MDP-MMO. Their results imply that the security of an iterated hash function is reduced to the security of the underlying block cipher to more extent with the MMO compression function than with the Davies-Meyer (DM) compression function.
Hirose, Park and Yun [7] proposed MDP, and showed that the keyed-via-IV mode and the key-prefix mode of an iterated hash function using MDP are PRFs on the assumption that the compression function is a PRF under a related key attack with respect to the permutation of MDP. MDP is one of the simplest and the most efficient domain extension transforms. Some of the first round candidates of NIST Cryptographic Hash Algorithm Competition [10] Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [2] showed that the cascade construction of a fixed-input-length PRF with prefixfree encoding is a variable-input-length PRF. Bellare [1] showed that HMAC is a PRF if the compression function of the underlying hash function is a PRF with two keying strategies. Yasuda proposed interesting PRF modes and provided the security proofs [13] - [15] . In his security proofs, it is also assumed that the compression function is a PRF. He did not consider its internal structure, either.
Preneel, Govaerts and Vandewalle defined a model of compression functions using a block cipher (the PGV model), which covers the Davies-Meyer, Matyas-MeyerOseas and Miyaguchi-Preneel modes [11] . They also provided a security analysis of the modes in their model against several generic attacks. Black, Rogaway and Shrimpton analyzed the modes in the PGV model in terms of provable security [4] . 
Definitions
Let Func(D, R) be the set of all functions from D to R, and Perm(D) be the set of all permutations on D. Let s $ ← S represent that an element s is selected from the set S under the uniform distribution.
Pseudorandom Bit Generator
Let g be a function such that g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} l , where n < l. Let A be a probabilistic algorithm which outputs 0 or 1 for a given input in {0, 1}
l . The prbg-advantage of A against g is defined as follows:
where the probabilities are taken over the coin tosses by A and the uniform distributions on {0, 1} n and {0, 1} l . g is called a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) if Adv prbg g (A) is negligible for any efficient A.
We will abuse the definition for n = l. Actually, for example, the identity function is trivially a PRBG for n = l.
Pseudorandom Function
Let f : K × D → R be a function family from D to R with a key space K. f (k, ·) is often denoted by f k (·). Let A be a probabilistic algorithm with oracle access to a function from D to R. A outputs 0 or 1. The prf-advantage of A against f is defined as follows: 
where the probabilities are taken over the coin tosses by A and the uniform distributions on K and Perm(D). p is called a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) if Adv prp p (A) is negligible for any efficient A.
Pseudorandom Function under Related-Key Attack
Pseudorandom functions under related-key attacks are first formalized by Bellare and Kohno [3] . We only consider a related-key attack with respect to a permutation ϕ as in [7] . We refer to this type of attack as the ϕ-related-key attack. Let A be a probabilistic algorithm with oracle access to a pair of functions from D to R. Each query by A is an element in D. A sends it to one of the functions, which returns a corresponding element in R. The prf-rka-advantage of A against f under the ϕ-related-key attack is given by
where the probabilities are taken over the coin tosses by A and the uniform distributions on K and
For a permutation, the prp-rka-advantage and the ϕ-rka-secure PRP can also be defined similarly.
MDP with MMO
We denote concatenation of sequences by . For sequences
. Let E : B × B → B be an (n, n) block cipher, where the first B is the key space. The Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) compression function [9] h : B × B → B with E is defined as follows: h(s, x) = E s (x)⊕ x, where s is a chaining variable and x is a message block.
The MDP transform [7] of h with a permutation π is
denoted by h
• π : B × B + → B and defined as follows: For
A padding function pad : {0, 1} * → B + is also necessary for the preprocessing of a given message of arbitrary length. Now, MDP-MMO is a scheme to construct a hash function using a block cipher E : B × B → B, a permutation π : B → B and an initial value IV ∈ B, which is defined as follows: Fig. 1 .
MDP-MMO is illustrated in

PRF Modes of MDP-MMO
For the PRF modes given in this section, any unambiguous padding suffices. Thus, we will assume that the length of a message input M is always a multiple of n, and do without pad. Namely, M = M 1 · · · M N , where M i ∈ B for 1 ≤ i ≤ N. M i is called a message block.
Keyed-via-IV Mode
A PRF is obtained from MDP-MMO by replacing the fixed initial value with a secret key. The function, KMDP-MMO, is illustrated in Fig. 2 . It is simply h
The security of KMDP-MMO is reduced to the security of the underlying block cipher. It resists any distinguishing attack that requires much fewer than 2 n/2 queries if the underlying block cipher is a π-rka-secure PRP.
Theorem 1:
Let A be a prf-adversary against h • π . Suppose that A runs in time at most t, and makes at mostueries, and each query has at most message blocks. Then, there exists a prp-rka-adversary B against E such that
B makes at mostueries and runs in time at most t + O( qT E ), where T E represents the time required to compute E.
π should be a permutation with at most a negligible number of fixed points. Otherwise, E cannot be a π-rkasecure PRP. Examples of possible candidates for π are bitwise addition of a nonzero constant or cyclic shift. Let us consider the tightness of the bound given in Theorem 1. The attack in [12] can break KMDP-MMO with about 2 n/2 / √ queries. Suppose that the best π-related-key attack against E as a PRP is exhaustive key search. Then, since the time complexity of B is t + O( qT E ), B can try
and
2 n .
The right side exceeds 1 if q ≈ 2 n/2 / . Thus, the gap is the factor of √ or more. Theorem 1 directly follows from two lemmas given in the remaining part.
Let A be an adversary with access to m pairs of oracles u 1 , u 1 , u 2 , u 2 , . . . , u m , u m . Each query by A is directed to just one of the 2m oracles. Let us define the following notation:
The m-prf-rka-advantage of A against h under the π-relatedkey attack is defined as follows:
Lemma 1 ([7]): Let A be a prf-adversary against h
• π . Suppose that A runs in time at most t, and makes at mostueries, and each query has at most message blocks. Then, there exists a prf-rka-adversary B against h with access to q pairs of oracles such that
B makes at most q queries and runs in time at most t + O( qT h ), where T h represents the time required to compute h.
A proof of Lemma 1 is given in Appendix. It is based on the hybrid argument [5] .
Let A be a prf-rkaadversary against h with m pairs of oracles. Suppose that A runs in time at most t, and makes at mostueries. Then, there exists a prp-rka-adversary B against E such that
B makes at most q queries and runs in time at most t + O(q T E ), where T E represents the time required to compute E.
A proof of this lemma is given below. It is also based on the hybrid argument.
Proof : For a permutation
A prp-rka-adversary B is constructed using A as a subroutine. The algorithm of B with oracles u, u is given below. u, u are either E K , E π(K) or , , where K $ ← B and , $ ← Perm(B).
runs A with oracles h K
Thus,
B makes at mostueries and runs in time at most t + 
O(q T E ).
There may exist an algorithm with the same resources and larger advantage. Let us also call it B. Then,
It is possible to distinguish˜ 1 ,˜ 1 , . . . ,˜ m ,˜ m and ρ 1 , ρ 1 , . . . , ρ m , ρ m only by the fact that there may be a collision for ρ(x) ⊕ x for ρ ∈ Func(B, B). Thus, since A makes at mostueries,
Key-Prefix Mode
The key-prefix mode is a method to construct a PRF with a given hash function. It simply feeds K M to the hash function as an input, where K is a secret key and M is a message input. The mode with MDP-MMO is illustrated in Fig. 3 . K is assumed to be in B. We call the function KPMDP-MMO. This mode uses MDP-MMO as a black box. In this sense, it is similar to HMAC. However, it is more efficient than HMAC.
Let ν E : B → B be a function such that ν E (K) = E IV (K) ⊕ K. KPMDP-MMO with a key K ∈ B and a mes-
KPMDP-MMO resists any distinguishing attack that requires much fewer than 2 n/2 queries if the underlying block cipher E is a π-rka-secure PRP and ν E is a PRBG.
Theorem 2:
Let A be a prf-adversary against h • π ν E . Suppose that A runs in time at most t, and makes at mostueries, and each query has at most message blocks. Then, there exist a prp-rka-adversary B against E, and a prbgadversary B against ν E such that
B makes at mostueries and runs in time at most t +
O( qT E ). B runs in time at most t + O( qT E ), where T E represents the time required to compute E.
Theorem 2 directly follows from Theorem 1 and the following lemma. It says that h
and ν E is a PRBG. The proof is easy and omitted.
Lemma 3: Let
B runs in time at most t + O( qn), makes at mostueries, and each query has at most message blocks. B runs in time at most t + O( qT h ), where T h represents the time required to compute h.
Discussion
It is discussed in this section if other block-cipher-based compression functions are useful for PRF modes given in the previous section as well as MMO. Table 1 gives 20 PGV compression functions for collision-resistant hash functions in the ideal cipher model [4] . h 1 is MMO, h 5 is DaviesMeyer, and h 3 is Miyaguchi-Preneel.
If the key of E is M i , then it is not secret and fully controlled by an adversary. Thus, it is impossible to reduce the security of the PRF modes in the previous section to the security of E for h j , where j ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 17, 19, 20} . In the remaining part, counterexamples are given which imply the impossibility to reduce the security of PRF modes to the security of E for h j , where j ∈ {2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18}. The observations show that MMO is the best choice for the PRF modes in terms of provable security. 
Example 1: Suppose that there exists some nonzero
should be mentioned that DES has this kind of property for d = 1 n . If E is used for h 9 , then
It implies that h 9 (K, ·) is not a PRF. h 11 , h 13 and h 14 are not PRFs, either, if E is used for them.
Example 2: Suppose that there exists some nonzero d ∈ {0, 1} n such that E K (M) = E K⊕d (M) for every K and M. E can be a PRP under the chosen plaintext attack. If E is used for h 10 , then
Thus, h 10 (K, ·) is not a PRF. h 12 , h 16 and h 18 are not PRFs, either, if E is used for them.
Counterexamples in Examples 1 and 2 are block ciphers insecure under the related-key attack with respect to d. On the other hand, two PRF modes in the previous section require a block cipher secure under the related-key attack with respect to π. Major difference is as follows:
• The designer of E in MDP-MMO has only to worry about the related-key attack with respect to π, which is also set by the designer.
• The designer of E in h 9 , for example, has to worry about all nonzero d.
Example 3:
Suppose that E K (K) = K for every K. E can be a PRP under the chosen plaintext attack. If E is used for h 4 , then
We can check if the oracle is h 4 (K, ·) or not with another query. Thus, h 4 (K, ·) is not a PRF. h 2 is not a PRF, either, if E is used for it.
Example 4:
Suppose that E K (M) = K ⊕ M for every K and M. E is a PRP under the chosen plaintext attack for any adversary making only one query (E is one-time pad). If E is used for h 3 , then
It implies that h 3 (K, ·) is not a PRF against an adversary making only one query.
Example 4 may be insignificant. However, it still implies that MMO seems preferable to Miyaguchi-Preneel in terms of provable security.
Conclusion
This article has discussed the provable security of two efficient PRF modes of an iterated hash function with the MMO compression function and the MDP domain extension transform. It has also been shown that the MMO compression function is best suited to MDP among the compression functions in the Preneel-Govaerts-Vandewalle model in terms of provable security.
Combined with [6] , this article implies that using MDP-MMO is a good strategy to construct a secure blockcipher-based hash function. 
B makes at mostueries and runs in time at most t + O( qT h ). There may exist an algorithm with the same resources and larger advantage. Let us also call it B. Then,
